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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h).

ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Issue: Does the term "residence" in the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act
mean where a military service-member parent legally resides or where the soldier
physically resides even if he is only there under compulsion because of military
orders?
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Brinkerhoffv.
Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d 113, 115 (Utah App. 1997). A correction of error standard
applies. Id. No deference is given to the trial court's interpretation. Id.
Issue Preserved: R:53-54; 91; 126-128; 168-174; 188-191; 199-214.
2. Issue: Do Utah military service-members retain their Utah residence under the
UIFSA even if the military deploys them to serve outside the state of Utah?
Standard of Review: Statutory interpretation is a question of law. Brinkerhoff,
945 P.2d at 115. A correction of error standard applies. Id. No deference is given
to the trial court's interpretation. Id.
Issue Preserved: R:53-54; 91; 126-128; 168-174; 188-191; 199-214.
3. Issue: Did the court below erroneously decline subject-matter jurisdiction to
modify the parties' registered child support order?
Standard of Review: Jurisdiction is a question of law. Case v. Case, 2004 UT
App 423, Tf 5, 103 P.3d 171. A correction of error standard applies. Id. No
-6Brief of the Appellant

deference is given to the trial court's determination. Id.
Issue Preserved: R:53-54; 91; 126-128; 168-174; 188-191; 199-214.
4. Issue: Did the court below exceed its discretion by ordering Husband to pay
Wife's attorney's fees and costs?
Standard of Review: Normally abuse of discretion. Bolliger v. Bolliger, 2000 UT
App 47, ^f 26, 997 P.2d 903. However, a discretionary decision premised on a
flawed legal conclusion constitutes a per se abuse of discretion, Lund v. Brown,
2000 UT 75, If 9, 11 P.3d 277, and conclusions of law are reviewed under a
correction of error standard without deference to the trial court's decision. See
Brinkerhoff, 945 P.2d at 115.
Issue Preserved: R:262-266; 318-322; 430-437.
5. Issue: Does this court retain authority to judicially review whether the court below
mistakenly declined jurisdiction in the first place notwithstanding California's
subsequent issuance of a modified child support order?
Standard of Review: Inapplicable because the court below never ruled on this
issue. Even if it had, preclusion presents a question of law this court reviews under
a correction of error standard without any deference to the court below. Gillmor v.
Family Link, LLC, 2010 UT App 2, If 10, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 3.
Issue Preserved: R:439-532.
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Resolution of the issues presented on appeal is governed by the following
provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (the "UIFSA"). Both California
and Utah have adopted substantially the same version of this uniform act.
"A tribunal of this state that has issued a child-support order consistent with the
law of this state has and shall exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify
its child-support order if the order is the controlling order, and:
(a) at the time of the filing of a request for modification, this state is the
residence of the obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the
support order is issued. ...".
California Family Code § 4909 and Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-205(l)("Section
205")
"If all of the parties who are individuals reside in this State and the child does not
reside in the issuing state, a tribunal of this state has jurisdiction to enforce and to
modify the issuing state's child support order in a proceeding to register that
order."
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-613(1) and California Family Code § 4962 ("Section
613").

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND RELEVANT FACTS
This is a proceeding to modify a sister-state's child support order in Utah pursuant
to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. The court below dismissed this case after
concluding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. That erroneous determination is the
subject of this appeal.
When reviewing a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction where the trial court relied on
documentary evidence without conducting an evidentiary hearing, this court accepts the
plaintiffs facts as true and resolves any disputes in plaintiffs favor. See Neways, Inc. v.
McCausland, 950 P.2d 420,422 (Utah 1997).
-8Brief of the Appellant

Background on the Parties
Appellant Aaron Lilly ("Husband") is a United States Marine from Utah. (R:53,
138-145). Husband was born, raised, and graduated high school in Utah. (R:466).
Husband enlisted in the Marine Corps in Utah in 1994. Id. On September 1, 2001,
Husband married Appellee Korille Lilly ("Wife") in Utah. Id.
During Husband's service in the military, the Marine Corps has deployed him to
serve at duty stations throughout the world such as Russia, Germany, Slovenia, Japan,
Thailand, the Philippines, and California. (R:294). Despite these numerous transfers,
Husband has always held himself out as a resident of Utah by, among other things, paying
Utah taxes on his military pay (R: 153-156; 159-160), maintaining his Utah drivers license
(R:136), the right to vote in Utah elections (R:127), listing his home as Kearns, Utah on
military records (R:141), and declaring his intent to return to live in Utah once released
from active-duty military service. (R: 126-127, 468). It is impossible for Husband to serve
within Utah because the Marine Corps does not have a base in Utah. (R:467-468).
Although Husband is, for the time being at least, stationed in California, it is a
judicially noticeable fact that he is subject to the orders of his superior officers and can be
transferred at any time at their whim. See Teague v. Third District Court, 289 P.2d 331,
333 (Utah 1955). Therefore, Husband's presence in California is presumptively temporary
because of his active-duty status.
While Husband was deployed to California under military orders, Wife tried to file
for a divorce against him in Utah. (R:487). Wife claims she could not because she was not
-9Brief of the Appellant

living in Utah at the time. Id. Undaunted, in April of 2005, Wife filed for a divorce in
California instead. Id. Although Husband was still a resident of Utah and only in
California because of military orders, he did not oppose Wife's divorce suit going
forward in California. (R:468). The parties' California Decree of Divorce contains no
finding that Husband ever established a domicile in California during the course of his
deployment there. (R:4-50). Rather, the decree simply notes Husband had a "place of
residence" to exercise parent-time in both San Diego and in Salt Lake City. (R:8).
On June 12, 2005, Wife returned to live in Utah along with the parties' minor
child. (R:179, 468). Wife and the parties' minor child have legally and physically resided
in Utah ever since. Id.
The parties eventually reached a settlement in Wife's California divorce
proceeding and the court issued a Decree of Dissolution of Marriage on December 6,
2006. (R:4-50). This Decree provided, among other things, that Husband would pay Wife
$1,000 per month in child support based on her earning no monthly income at the time.
(R-.12-13).
Following the divorce, Wife obtained gainful employment in Utah. (R: 100-101,
258). Accordingly, Husband desired to modify child support to take into account Wife's
higher income. (R:53-54). Husband also desired to transfer and modify the parties' child
support order in Utah given the fact he still legally resided in Utah and Wife had reestablished her residence in Utah. Id.
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The Utah Proceeding
On November 13, 2007, Husband, acting pro se, registered the parties' California
Divorce Decree in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County, Utah, to begin the
process of modifying that order in Utah. (R:l-3). Pursuant to the Uniform Interstate
Family Support Act and Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act,
Husband gave Wife twenty (20) days to oppose registration of their California Divorce
Decree in Utah. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-606. Wife never contested registration and
the California Decree was subsequently registered as a Utah court order. (R:163).
On November 27, 2007, Husband, still acting pro se, filed a "Petition to Modify
Custody Order" asking the Utah court to modify child support, albeit with an
unconventional caption. (R:53-54). Husband then filed an amended "Parentage Petition"
on December 27, 2007 renewing his request to modify child support. (R:59-77).
On December 3, 2007, the California court conducted a hearing on Wife's motion
to increase Husband's child support obligation in California and denied her motion based
on the fact Husband was moving the Utah court to modify child support. (R:105-106).The
California court ruled that:
"If Utah refuses to exert jurisdiction over the issue [of modifying child support
then] either party may file their motion to be heard before this [California] court.
If no motion has been brought in Utah for modification of child support, either party
may file a motion requesting modification of child support to be heard before this
court." (R:106)(emphasis added).
Wife subsequently moved the Utah court to dismiss Husband's Parentage Petition.
(R:86-88). At the hearing on Wife's motion on March 26, 2008, the Domestic Relations
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Commissioner remarked that Utah might lack subject-matter jurisdiction to modify child
support because of Husband's military deployment in California. (R:388, Hrg. Transcr.
9:22-11:16 (March 10, 2008)). Nevertheless, the court declined to dismiss the Petition to
modify child support. Id. Instead, the court held a Parentage Petition was an improper
mechanism to modify child support. Id. at 11:14-12:1. Accor4ingly, the court granted
Husband leave of court to submit an amended Petition to modify child support. Id. at
12:4-11.
Husband then retained counsel in Utah and, on June 25, 2008, filed an amended
petition to modify child support in Utah asserting Utah had subject-matter jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. §§ 7B-14-205 and 613 because both parents and their child legally
resided in Utah and neither party had a California residence. (R: 126-134). Husband
explained that his physical presence in California was merely temporary on account of his
military deployment, that he had maintained his legal residenpe in Utah, and that he
intended to return to Utah following his release from military service. (R: 126-127).
Rather than waiting for Utah to decide whether it would assert jurisdiction, Wife
ignored the California court's order deferring the question of jurisdiction to Utah and, on
or about July 29, 2008, renewed her motion for California to increase Husband's child
support obligation.
On August 18, 2008, Husband filed a motion asking tjie Utah court, among other
things, to decide whether it would assert subject-matter jurisdiction. (R: 168-174). At the
September 17, 2008, hearing on Husband's motion, the Utah Commissioner denied
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Husband's motion and held the UIFSA looks only at where a military service-member
parent is physically stationed regardless of where his legal residence might be. (R:386,
Hrg. Transcr. 24:9-27:5, 28:1-30:4 (September 26, 2008). Accordingly, the Commissioner
concluded Utah lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to modify child support as long as
Husband remained stationed in California even though his Wife and daughter resided in
Utah. Id. Husband filed a timely objection to the Commissioner's recommendation on
September 26, 2008 and requested a hearing before the District Court Judge. (R: 199-214).
On or about September 27, 2008, Wife moved the Utah court to compel Husband
to pay all her attorney's fees and costs because she prevailed on the question of whether
Utah should have accepted jurisdiction or not. (R:216-217). Husband opposed the motion.
(R:262-266, 319-322).
On September 30, 2008, after Wife informed the California court that Utah had
declined jurisdiction, California granted Wife's motion to increase Husband's child
support and issued a modified support order. (R:484-500). The California court's stated
basis for retaining jurisdiction was (1) because Husband made a "general appearance"
litigating jurisdiction in California, (2) because Husband did not object to Wife
registering the Utah child support order in California, and (3) because Husband was
physically stationed in California. (R:485-488). However, the California court made no
finding that Husband was ever domiciled in California. (R:484-499).
On October 22, 2008, the Utah Commissioner ordered Husband to pay all of Wife
attorney's fees and costs because she prevailed on the jurisdictional dispute. (R:323-325).
-13Brief of the Appellant

Although the court found her fees were reasonable and Husband had the ability to pay,
the court made no finding that Wife needed help paying her l^gal expenses. Id.
On October 28, 2008, the Utah District Court denied Husband's objection to the
Commissioner's recommendation on the issue of jurisdiction, (R:315-316), and later
denied his objection to the award of attorney's fees and costs. (R:360-361).
Following the resolution of several post-judgment matters and entry of a final
appealable judgment, Husband timely appealed the Utah trial court's decision (1) that the
residence of a Utah military-service member under the UIFSA is where the military
stations that soldier, (2) that the UIFSA looks only to the physical and not legal residence
of Utah service-members, (3) that Utah lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter,
and (4) ordering Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees and costs. (R:559-584).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (the "UIFSA") is a uniform act
adopted by all fifty states for the purpose of ensuring interstate child support modification
and enforcement laws are uniform across the country. The UIFSA is premised on the idea
that only one state can have subject-matter jurisdiction to modify a child support order at
any given time based on the "residence" of each parent. Because the purpose of the
UIFSA is to narrowly restrict jurisdiction to a single state, the term "residence" must
mean legal residence (of which there can only be one) as opposed to physical residence
(of which there can be many). Construing "residence" as legal residence in the context of
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the UIFSA is an acceptable plain-meaning interpretation because the UIFSA is a national
law, and nationally "residence" in domestic relations statutes is construed as legal
residence. Tellingly, every appellate court to consider what "residence" in the UIFSA
means has uniformly treated it as legal residence. To disregard the compelling need to
interpret the UIFSA in a consistent manner across state lines would promulgate further
interstate jurisdictional conflicts and would promulgate absurd results by forcing courts to
disregard common sense and consider military service-members deployed to, for
example, Iraq as having an Iraqi residence under the UIFSA.
Second, it is undisputed that Husband was a bona-fide and actual resident of Utah
at the time he enlisted in the Marine Corps in Utah. Because Husband has maintained his
ties to Utah throughout his military service by, among other things, paying Utah taxes on
his military pay, the right to vote in Utah elections, maintaining his Utah drivers license,
and because he plans to return to Utah once released from military service, Husband's
legal residence presumptively remains in Utah.
Therefore, because Husband legally resides in Utah and because Wife and the
parties' child reside in Utah, Utah has subject-matter jurisdiction to modify the parties'
child support order under Section 613 of the UIFSA. Because the court below held
otherwise based on Husband's military deployment in California, its judgment must be
reversed. Likewise, the trial court's order commanding Husband to pay attorney's fees
and costs must also be reversed because it is premised on a flawed legal conclusion.
Wife cannot use claim preclusion to sustain the otherwise erroneous judgment of
-15Brief of the Appellant

the court below based on California's issuance of modified child support order after the
court below mistakenly declined jurisdiction. California deferred the question of which
state should exercise jurisdiction to this state in its initial ruling. Therefore, this court
retains authority to judicially review whether it was error for the court below to decline
jurisdiction and, finding such error, to reverse that decision w^hile giving full faith and
credit to California's judgment delegating the question of jurisdiction to Utah. The
Restatement (Second) of Judgments authorizes this court to d^ny preclusive effect to a
subsequent judgment made in reliance on an erroneous decision by the court below that
would substantially infringe on the appellate authority of this tribunal and its power to
ensure lower courts are correctly following the law.
For these reasons, the judgment of the court below miist be reversed.

ARGUMENT
"From the Halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli," military service-members
are regularly moved across the globe as they fight to keep out nation safe from harm. As a
result, Utah service-members and their families are often faced with great uncertainty
when asked where their "residence" is.
The question posed by this appeal is whether, under tlie Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act (the "UIFSA"), a Utah military service-member retains his residence in Utah
even though the military orders him to serve outside Utah's borders for years at a time.
For the reasons discussed in this brief, the answer is that a Uf;ah service-member retains
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his residence in Utah throughout the duration of his military service absent clear and
convincing proof the service-member intends to abandon his Utah residence and
permanently live elsewhere. Inasmuch as the court below held otherwise and mistakenly
concluded it lacked jurisdiction because of Husband's military deployment to California,
its judgment must be reversed.
This brief is divided into five parts. Because subject-matter jurisdiction is always a
threshold issue, Case v. Case, 2004 UT App 423, ^ 6, 103 P.3d 171, Husband will first
discuss (1) why the term "residence" and its variations in the UIFSA means legal
residence, (2) that he still legally resides in Utah, and therefore (3) Utah has subjectmatter jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-613. Next, Husband will show (4) the
court below exceeded its discretion by ordering Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees
and costs, and (5) California's subsequent reliance on the erroneous judgment of the court
below carries no preclusive effect. Based on these points and the authorities discussed
herein, the judgment of the court below must be reversed.
I.

"RESIDENCE" IN THE UNIFORM INTERSTATE FAMILY
SUPPORT ACT MEANS LEGAL RESIDENCE.
The question of whether the court below erroneously declined subject-matter

jurisdiction to modify Husband's child support order is governed by the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (the "UIFSA"). Case, 2004 UT App 423 at If 7. The UIFSA
is a uniform law Congress compelled all fifty states to adopt in order to ensure child
support modification and enforcement laws are uniform across state lines. Id. atfflf7-8.
This appeal presents a question of first impression: does the term "residence" in the
-17Brief of the Appellant

context of the UIFSA mean where a military-service member parent physically or legally
resides?
The Utah Supreme Court explained that to resolve questions of statutory
interpretation:
"[w]e look first to the plain language of the statutes to| determine their meaning
and to discern the intent of the legislature. We also examine the purpose of the
statute and its relation to other statutes. Provisions within a statute are interpreted
in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under
the same and related chapters. We do so because a statute is passed as a whole and
not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent.
Consequently, each party or section should be construed in connection with every
other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Moreover, we avoid an
interpretation that would embrace a result so absurd tfyat it could not have been
intended by the legislature." Berneau v. Martino, 20($ UT 87,1j 12, 646 Utah Adv.
Rep. 30 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
When determining whether a statutory term or phrase is ambiguous, a court must
not read those words in isolation from the rest of the statute. tDA v. Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. 120, 132, 120 S.Ct. 1291, 146 L.Ed.24 121 (2000). The plain
meaning - or ambiguity - of certain words or phrases may orily become apparent when
read in context with the rest of the statute. Id. {citing Brown V. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115,
118, 115 S.Ct. 552 (1994)("Ambiguity is a creature not of definitional possibilities but of
statutory cortex/. ")(emphasis added).
Finally, this court must remain mindful that the UIFSA is no ordinary Utah law.
Because the purpose of the UIFSA is to make interstate child support enforcement and
modifications laws uniform across the country, Case, 2004 UT App 423 atfflf7-8, the
Utah Legislature has instructed Utah courts that "[i]n applyijig and construing it
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consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity of the law with respect to
its subject matter among states that enact it." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-901 (emphasis
added). Accordingly, this court always looks at how its sister-states have construed the
UIFSA to ensure Utah's UIFSA remains consistent with its sister-states. Case, 2004 UT
App423 at Tflj 16-17.
With these rules in mind, we turn to the main statutes at issue. Section 205 of the
UIFSA provides that the state which issued an original child support order (in this case,
California) retains "exclusive, continuing jurisdiction" to modify its order so long as it
remains the "residence" of either parent or their child. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14205(1 )(a). Section 613 of the UIFSA in turn provides that if all of the parties "reside" in
this state and the child does not reside in the issuing state (California), Utah acquires
subject-matter jurisdiction to modify that support order. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14613(1). The difficulty in harmonizing these statutes is the UIFSA does not define whether
the word "residence" and its variations in Sections 205 and 613 means where a military
service-member parent legally or physically resides.
A. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN LEGAL AND PHYSICAL RESIDENCE,
Before beginning a discussion of why legal residence is the most sensible
interpretation of this term, it is imperative to discuss the difference between one's
physical residence and legal residence (also known as domicile). Physical residence just
means bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place regardless of whether that stay is
temporary or indefinite. Keene v. Bosner, 2005 UT App 37, If 11, 107 P.3d 693. On the
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other hand, legal residence requires both bodily presence in a given place coupled with
the intention to make that place one's home. Id. Under these definitions, a person can
have multiple physical residences but never more than a singly legal residence at any
given time. Id.
B. THE MEANING OF "RESIDENCE" DEPENDS ON THE CONTEXT IN
WHICH IT IS USED,
Courts and legal scholars have long referred to "residence" as a slippery eel whose
proper meaning ultimately depends on the context in which it is used. See In re Morelli,
91 Cal.Rptr. 72, 78-9 (Cal.App.2.Dist. 1970); Willis L.M. Re^se & Robert S. Green, That
Elusive Wordy "Residence, " 6 Vand. L.Rev. 561 (1953). Utah's legislature and courts
have interpreted "residence" and "resides" differently depending on the context the terms
are used in. Keene v. Bosner, 2005 UT App 37 at ^| 11; Framq v. Residency Appeals
Committee of Utah State Univ., 675 P.2d 1157, 1159 fn. 1 (Utah 1983)("In some contexts
the terms residence and domicile have different meanings, bu^: for the purpose of this
opinion we will treat them synonymously"); Government Emft. Ins. Co. v. Dennis, 645
P.2d 672, 674 (Utah 1982)(While domicile is the most steadfast of words, residence, on
the other hand, has about as many colors as Joseph's cloak and no precise, technical, and
fixed definition applicable to all cases). For example, in the context of Utah's Cohabitant
Abuse Act, this court construed "residence" anew as physical presence to ensure victims
of domestic violence could seek protective orders against their attackers wherever they
might be found even if that was not their attacker's legal domicile. Keene, 2005 UT App
37 at Iff 11, 15. Conversely, in suits over voter registration statutes the Utah Supreme
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Court interpreted "resides" and "residence" narrowly as legal residence to ensure a person
could not vote in more than a single locale at a time. Dodge v. Evans, 716 P.2d 270, 275
(Utah 1985). The Utah Supreme Court has also interpreted "residence" as synonymous
with domicile in divorce jurisdictional statutes unless the statute expressly requires actual
physical residence. See Munsee v. Munsee, 363 P.2d 71, 72 (Utah 1961)(We consider the
phrase bona fide residence to be synonymous with domicile]. But 'actual residence'
requires something more).
In an effort to cage this slippery eel, this court has sometimes turned to the
dictionary to determine how to interpret "residence." Keene, 2005 UT App 37 at ^[ 11.
When called upon to interpret this term anew in the context of Utah's domestic violence
laws, this court relied on Webster's Dictionary which defines "residence" as "a temporary
or permanent dwelling place, abode, or habitation to which one intends to return as
distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn or transient visit." Id. {citing Webster's
Third New International Dictionary 1931 (1993)). On the other hand, the MerriamWebster Dictionary (which proclaims itself as being America's "best-selling Dictionary")
defines "residence" as either "the place where one actually lives as distinguished from
one's domicile or a place of temporary sojourn" or "the status of a legal resident."
Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1060 (11th Ed.)(emphasis added). The
Merriam-Webster Dictionary also defines "reside" as either "to dwell permanently or
continuously" or "to occupy a place as one's legal domicile." Id- (emphasis added).
Consequently, an appeal to dictionaries used by laymen fails to authoritatively establish a
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single "plain meaning" definition of the words "residence" and "resides," but rather
recognizes these words are open to more than one reasonable interpretation.1
Given this inherent ambiguity, this court must analyze the UIFSA's provisions in
context to determine which interpretation of "residence" would (1) best fulfill the
fundamental purposes of the UIFSA, (2) ensure child support modification laws remain
uniform between the states, and (3) avoid absurd consequences not intended by the
Legislature.
C. READ IN CONTEXT, "RESIDENCE" MEANS LEGAL RESIDENCE
Construing "residence" as legal residence is supported by the plain language and
official comments of the UIFSA. In the words of the drafters, the purpose of Section 205
in the UIFSA is to ensure "only one valid support order may be effective at any one time"
even though the parties and their children may move from state to state. In re Marriage of
Amezquita, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 887, 889-90 (Cal.App. 3 Dist. 2002). Under this section,
California retains "continuing, exclusive jurisdiction" only if it is Husband's "residence."
If California's jurisdiction is exclusive then, by definition, neither Utah nor any other
state could have jurisdiction. Therefore, the language of the UIFSA assumes a person

l
The purpose of Utah's domestic violence statutes are to enlarge - not restrict which courts can have jurisdiction to give relief to domestic violence victims. Public
policy is well-served by construing "residence" as broadly as possible to ensure
perpetrators of domestic violence are held accountable for their wrongs. Conversely, the
purpose of the UIFSA is to restrict - not enlarge - the number of states having
jurisdiction to modify a child support order at any given timq.
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cannot have more than one "residence."2 Id. at 890. However, this does not support
interpreting the term as physical residence because a person can have multiple physical
residences, but can never legally reside in more than one place at a time. Id. Therefore,
"residence," viewed in context with the UIFSA as a whole, must mean legal residence of
which there can only be one.
Furthermore, courts generally construe "residence," whether used as a noun or a
verb, as synonymous with legal residence in the context of statutes that prescribe
residence as a qualification for the enjoyment of a privilege, the exercise of a franchise, or
the venue for an action. Dodge, 716 P.2d at 275; In re Marriage of Basilehu 890 N.E.2d
779, 787 (Ind.App.2008); See Utah Code Ann. § 20A-2-105; 12 A.L.R.2d 757 § 3
(Majority rule is that residence in venue statutes, regardless of whether the term is used as
a noun or a verb, is synonymous with domicile). Thus, under the UIFSA, if Husband's
"residence" remains in Utah he will continue to enjoy access to Utah's courts for the
purpose of modifying his existing child support order in addition to other rights and
protections afforded to Utah residents. Basileh, 890 N.E.2d at 787. This constitutes the
enjoyment of a privilege, the exercise of a franchise, and the setting of a proper venue for
an action as envisioned by courts that have construed "residence," in both noun and verb
form, as meaning legal residence. Id. In a similar vein, Wife will enjoy the benefit of only

2
Compare with Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-205(2)(a) which uses the term "state of
residence" rather than "states of residence" or "a state of residence." Furthermore,
Section 205(1 )(a) speaks in terms of "the residence" as opposed to "a residence" or
"residences" further implying the drafter's assumption that each parent would only have a
single "residence."
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having to travel to a local Utah courthouse (rather than having to travel all the way out to
California) if she ever wants to modify child support or bring an enforcement action
against Husband.
D. LEGAL RESIDENCE IS AN ACCEPTABLE PLAIN-MEANING
CONSTRUCTION OF "RESIDENCE."
Interpreting the terms "residence" and "resides" in the UIFSA as meaning "legal
residence" and "legally resides" does not stretch these words beyond an acceptable, plainmeaning limit. The commonly-used Merriam-Webster Dictionary expressly recognizes
these words are often used as synonyms for domicile. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate
Dictionary 1060 (11 Ed.). Furthermore, it is well-documented both in Utah, Munsee, 363
P.2d at 72, and on a national level, 27A C.J.S. Divorce § 154, that courts regularly
construe "residence" and "resides" as legal residence in domestic relations statutes unless
the statute explicitly requires actual residence. Because the UIFSA is a national law, the
Utah Legislature was presumably aware of this and expected courts interpreting the
UIFSA to look at how this term is defined on a national level in order to promote national
uniformity of its jurisdictional provisions. See Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-901.
E. INTERPRETING "RESIDENCE" AS LEGAL RESIDENCE IS ESSENTIAL
TO PROMOTE NATIONAL UNIFORMITY,
Interpreting "residence" as legal residence is the only interpretation that will avoid
interstate jurisdictional conflicts. Although this is a case of first impression for Utah, this
court is not writing on a clean slate. Several of Utah's sister-states have already analyzed
what "residence" in the UIFSA means and they agree the term means legal residence.
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Under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-901, courts construing the UIFSA must give
consideration to the need to promote uniform interpretations of the UIFSA because
conflicting interpretations will lead to jurisdictional uncertainty, encourage forum
shopping, and will condemn more military families to costly, protracted litigation like this
as they try to reconcile different versions of what was supposed to be a national, uniform
law designed to prevent such conflicts.
California
Under facts similar to the instant case, the California Court of Appeal held the
term "residence" in the UIFSA meant domicile. Amezquita, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 887. After
thoroughly examining the UIFSA's official comments and statutory context, the court
reasoned that because the UIFSA is designed to narrowly restrict jurisdiction to a single
state and the UIFSA assumes each parent only has one "residence," the term must mean
domicile - of which there can only be one - rather than mere physical presence. Id. at
888-91. Because the father was only in California because of a military assignment and
showed no intention to permanently live in California after retirement, he did not have a
California residence under the UIFSA. Id. at 890-91.
Minnesota
Three years later, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that because the UIFSA
narrowly permits only one state to exercise continuing, exclusive jurisdiction and assumes
each parent only has one "residence," the term must mean domicile. Block v. Block, 2005
WL 89472 fn. 1 (Minn.App. Jan 18, 2005) (Unpublished).
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Georgia
Following Amezquita and Block, the Georgia Court of Appeals concurred in its
sister-state's reasoning that "residence" in the UIFSA means legal residence, and a
military service-member father stationed in Georgia under military orders remained a
legal resident of the state he joined the army in. Kean v. Marshall 669 S.E.2d 463, 46466 (Ga.App. 2008).
Alabama
In Lattimore v. Lattimore, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals construed the term
"residence" in the UIFSA as legal residence. 991 So.2d 239, 243-44 (Ala.Civ.App. 2008).
However, because the appeal arose in the context of a motion to dismiss the court was
required to accept as true the mother's claim that her service-member husband acquired a
legal residence in Alabama. Id. Accordingly, the court remanded the case for further fact
finding. Id. However, the court reaffirmed the longstanding presumption that "a person
who is inducted into military service retains residence in the state from which he is
inducted until a new residence is established or the initial residence is abandoned." Id.
Missouri
In State ex. rel. Havlin, the Missouri Court of Appeals held a father who left
Tennessee because of a temporary overseas work assignment remained a resident of
Tennessee under the UIFSA because he still paid taxes in his home state, maintained his
voter registration, vehicle registration, and intended to return home after his overseas
assignment was complete. 971 S.W.2d 938 (Mo.App. 1998). In doing so, the court

-26Brief of the Appellant

engaged in a domicile analysis and implicitly construed "residence" as meaning legal
residence. Id.
Texas
The Court of Appeals of Texas held it lost exclusive, continuing jurisdiction under
the UIFSA to modify a child support previously issued by a Texas court even though the
father was physically living in Texas because he only was back in Texas because he was
incarcerated in a Texas prison. Grimes v. McFarland, 2003 WL 21787030 (Tex.App,Houston (14 Dist.)(Unpublished). The court held the father did not "reside" in Texas
under the UIFSA because he was only in Texas under compulsion, and analogized his
situation that of a military service-member stationed in Texas who likewise would not be
considered a Texas resident. Cf. Id. (citing Randle v. Randle, 178 S.W.2d 570, 572
(Tex.Civ.App.-Galveston 1944)(Soldier stationed in Texas did not 'reside' in Texas).
Indiana
Construing the UIFSA's federal counterpart, the Full Faith and Credit for Child
Support Orders Act (the "FFCCSOA"), the Court of Appeals of Indiana held the term
"residence" meant domicile. Basileh, 890 N.E.2d at 787. The court reasoned that courts
treat "residence" and "domicile" as synonyms when construing a statute that prescribes
residence as a qualification for the enjoyment of a privilege or exercise of a franchise, and
the father would enjoy continued access to Indiana court's if he remained a legal resident
of Indiana. Id. Following further judicial review, the Supreme Court of Indiana summarily
affirmed the Court of Appeals' interpretation of "residence" and held it applied with
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equal force to the UIFSA itself. In re the Marriage of Basileh^ 912 N.E.2d 814, 817 fn. 1
(Ind. 2009).
Given the fact every state to consider what "residence" means in the context of the
UIFSA has construed it as legal residence, this state cannot adopt a contrary interpretation
without inviting jurisdictional conflicts. Military service-members from Utah would be
thrust into perpetual confusion with no way of knowing, short, of costly protracted
litigation like this, where their "residence" is under the UIFSA was if this court said it
was where they were physically stationed, but the state where they were stationed in (e.g.
California, Texas, Minnesota, Georgia, Alabama, Indiana, or Missouri) said it was their
legal residence.
F. INTERPRETING "RESIDENCE" AS PHYSICAL RESIDENCE WOULD
LEAD TO ABSURD RESULTS AND JURISDICTIONAL CONFLICTS,
Finally, this court must reject any interpretation that could lead to absurd results.
State ex. rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54, If 11,165 P.3d 1206. The "absurd results" canon of
statutory interpretation is an equally well-settled caveat to the "plain meaning" doctrine
and states a court should not follow the literal language of a statute if doing so would lead
to absurd results not intended by the Legislature. Id. Although the "plain meaning" canon
enjoys a robust presumption in its favor, it is also true that a legislative body cannot, in
every instance, be counted on to have said what it meant or to have meant what it said. Id.
Because service-members are subject to the orders of their superior officers, they
have no choice where they want to live. Teague, 289 P.2d at 333. Consequently, to hold
that Utah military service-members acquire a "residence" whenever the military
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fortuitously happens to station them leads to patently absurd results. For example, it
would defy common sense to say a service-member deployed to Iraq as part of our
country's war on terror resides in Iraq or has an Iraqi residence. Rather, common sense
tells us the soldier is probably there on a temporary assignment and will return home at
the end of the war or his release from military service. Nevertheless, if the UIFSA is
construed as looking at physical presence regardless of whether that presence is
compulsory then, under the broad definition of this term espoused in Keene, this Utah
soldier resides in Iraq and has forfeit any claim to having a Utah residence because he
decided to serve his country. This is a patent example of an absurd result.
Adding to this absurdity, if the service-member's spouse then left Utah (assuming
Utah issued their original support order), Utah would lose exclusive, continuing
jurisdiction over child support order because of the soldier's deployment. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-14-205 (Issuing state loses exclusive jurisdiction when both parents and their
child no longer have a "residence" in this state). As a result, Utah service-members would
lose the stability associated with keeping their child support cases in Utah and would live
in fear of having their support orders modified every time they got moved.
Likewise, service-members from Utah's sister-states temporarily stationed at Hill
Air Force Base or Camp Williams thinking they still legally resided in their respective
home-states would be surprised to discover they now had a Utah residence under the
UIFSA and were subject to having their child support cases modified here. Under these
absurd circumstances, it would be possible for two states (Utah and the soldier's home-

-29Brief of the Appellant

state) to have jurisdiction to modify a support order at the same time.
Because there is no way the Utah Legislature could have intended such absurd
consequences, it is imperative Utah join with its sister-states who have uniformly agreed
"residence" in the UIFSA means legal residence.
II.

BECAUSE HUSBAND JOINED THE MILITARY IN UTAH, HE
PRESUMPTIVELY CONTINUES TO LEGALLY RESIDE IN UTAH.
Having shown that "residence" in the UIFSA means legal residence, the next issue

for this court to resolve is where Husband's legal residence is. Because the court below
did not make any findings of fact on this issue, (R: 556), the proper inquiry on appeal is
whether Husband has made a prima-facie case that he has retained his Utah residency
since joining the Marine Corps in Utah back in 1994. To resolve this question, it is
necessary to first review the law of domicile.
In several different contexts, the Utah Legislature has defined legal residence (or
domicile) as the place where (1) an individual has a fixed permanent home and principal
establishment, (2) to which the individual if absent intends to return, and (3) in which the
individual and his family voluntarily reside, not for a special br temporary purpose, but
with the intention of making a permanent home. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-la202(a)(emphasis added); Cf Utah Code Ann. § 20A-2-105. A legal residence, once
established, cannot be lost until another legal residence is acquired. See Utah Code Ann. §
20A-2-105(4)(j)(iii); Utah Code Ann. §§ 20A-2-105(4)(c)(i); 31A-29-103; 25 Am. Jur. 2d
Domicil § 28. While domicile presumptively follows physical residence, Allen v.
Greyhound Lines, Inc., 583 P.2d 613, 615 (Utah 1978), this presumption does not apply
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to military service-members. See Utah Code Ann. § 20A-2-105(4)(c)(i); Dodge, 716 P.2d
at 274 (Acquisition of a domicile requires some free exercise of the will on the part of the
person involved. An act done by him under physical compulsion will be legally
ineffective for this purpose). Rather, the law presumes military service-members continue
to legally reside in the state they joined the military absent proof they have abandoned
their initial domicile and established a new one. See Teague, 289 P.2d at 333 ("This court
might take judicial notice to the fact that a soldier is subject to transfer at any time and
that his presence in any one place will probably be temporary."); 21 A.L.R.2d 1163
(Practically all authorities agree that military personnel retain a domicile in the state from
which they entered military service); 28 C.J.S. Domicile § 35 (Because a person in
military service is subject to the orders of his superior officers, he retains a domicile or
residence in the state from which he entered the service). This rebuttable presumption of
continued residency can only be overcome by clearing and convincing proof that the
service-member intends to make his duty station his new permanent home. 25 Am. Jur. 2d
Domicil § 28. Simply put, a soldier's mere physical presence in a place under military
orders is insufficient to prove a change in domicile.
The pivotal case illustrating these principles involved a Navy sailor who, after
spending 11 years away from his home-state of Maryland in military service, sued for a
divorce in Maryland. Wamslev v. Wamsley, 635 A.2d 1322, 1322-23 (Md. 1994).
Maryland's highest court unanimously held that notwithstanding the sailor's many years
of absence while in military service, he still resided in Maryland because he joined the
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Navy in Maryland, held Maryland out as his home on military records, maintained his
driver's license and voter registration in Maryland, and paid Maryland income taxes. Id.
at 1325-1326. This holding is in accord with how the majority of states have resolved
similar issues. Id. at 1325 fn. 1.
Similarly, the California Court of Appeal held the fact a father was stationed in
California under military orders was insufficient to give him a California domicile.
Amezquita, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 887. The court explained that:
"[although Husband has lived in California for several years on military
assignment, the record is uncontradicted that he does not intend to remain here
after retirement and, instead, intends to return to New Mexico. He retains his New
Mexico driver's license, and he votes and pays taxes there." Id.
In re the Marriage of Thornton, the California Court of Appeal held that even
acquisition of a house in California by a military service-meniber was insufficient to
prove a soldier intended to make California his new domicile if contradicted by other
evidence. 185 Cal.Rptr. 388, 393-94 (Cal.App 5 Dist. 1982). The Wamslev court
explained:
"[t]he fact that members of the military are frequently tnoved about under military
orders will more than explain why an individual occupies a place of abode beyond
the state's borders. In the case of members of the military, as in other cases, the
rules for determining domicile may be applied differently in a particular case, but
the basic thrust thereof is to get the best indication of intent."
634 A.2d at 1325. (internal citations omitted).
Here, there is no dispute whatsoever that Husband was born, raised, and graduated
high school in Utah. Therefore, Husband was a bona-fide and actual resident of Utah
under every conceivable definition of the term when he enlistpd in the Marine Corps in
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1994. The record clearly shows that throughout his deployments in Russia, Germany,
Slovenia, Japan, Thailand, the Philippines, and California, Husband has always paid Utah
income taxes on his military pay, remained registered to vote in Utah elections,
maintained his Utah driver's license, held Utah out as his home on military records, and
has submitted sworn testimony declaring his intention to return to live in Utah once
released from military service. Under these facts, Husband has sufficiently proved that his
domicile remains in Utah and he has never established a residence elsewhere.
Because the law presumes that Husband already is, and remains, a Utah resident,
the burden of proof must necessarily shift to Wife to rebut this presumption by proving, if
she can, that Husband abandoned his Utah residence and established a new domicile in
California. However, the fact Wife sued Husband for a divorce in California while he was
stationed there is insufficient to prove Husband ever formed the requisite intent to
abandon his Utah residence and permanently remain behind in California. Rather, both
California and Utah law allow divorce proceedings to go forward even if only one spouse
is a domiciliary of that state. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-1(2) and California Family Code
§ 2320. California Family Code § 2322 even recognizes that it is possible for a husband
and wife to each have a "separate domicile and residence for the purpose of a divorce
proceeding depending upon proof of the fact and not upon legal presumptions."
(emphasis added).
Because Wife voluntarily chose California as the forum for their divorce - not
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Husband - she presumptively claimed a California residence in the process.3 The record
is devoid of any proof that Husband ever intended to remain in California following their
divorce for any reason other than his military deployment. Under similar facts, the
California Court of Appeal held that a military service-member stationed in California
who was sued for divorce by his wife in California and consented to entry of child
custody, support, and property division orders did not establish a California residence. In
re the Marriage of Tucker, 277 Cal.Rptr. 403 (Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1994). Because the
husband still paid Florida income taxes, voted in Florida elections, and listed Florida as
his home on military records, his wife could not carry her burden of proving he ever
formed the requisite intent to permanently reside in California after the divorce so as to
make him a California domiciliary. Id. at 408-409.
In light of Husband's undisputed continuing connections to Utah (paying taxes,
voter registration, drivers license, holding himself out as a Ut^h resident on military
records, and subjective intent to return), the presumption Husband continues to legally
reside in Utah remains un-rebutted. Therefore, the court below committed prejudicial
error by dismissing Husband's Petition to modify without considering this presumption.

3
The Commissioner expressed his bewilderment at how this was possible given that
Wife was only in California because she accompanied her military service-member
husband there and presumably would have remained a Utah resident along with him.
R:386, Hrg. Transcr. 9:21-10:18 (September 17, 2008). While Husband agrees the
Commissioner's suspicions about Wife's claim to California residency are well taken, the
time to litigate whether Wife ever had the requisite intent to become a California
domiciliary has long passed, and the parties are presumably estopped to deny the validity
of their original Divorce Decree.
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Consequently, its judgment must be reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
III.

BECAUSE BOTH PARTIES AND THEIR CHILD LEGALLY
RESIDE IN UTAH, THIS STATE HAS SUBJECT-MATTER
JURISDICTION UNDER SECTION 613 OF THE UIFSA.
Because Husband joined the Marine Corps in Utah and has maintained extensive

ties to Utah for all the reasons discussed supra, Husband continues to legally reside in
Utah. The court below made no findings sufficient to rebut this presumption. Therefore,
under Section 205 of the UIFSA, Utah Code Ann. § 78B-14-205(1), California lost
exclusive, continuing jurisdiction to modify the parties' child support order once Wife
returned to Utah because she no longer had a California residence {assuming she had one
to begin with) and Husband never acquired a California residence. Utah acquired
jurisdiction to modify the parties' California support order under Section 613 of the
UIFSA, Utah Code Ann, § 78B-14-613(1), once Wife returned to Utah because now both
parents and their child legally reside in Utah. Consequently, it was error for the court
below to dismiss Husband's Petition to modify, and its decision must be reversed.
IV.

THE LOWER COURT EXCEEDED ITS DISCRETION BY
ORDERING HUSBAND TO PAY WIFE'S ATTORNEY'S FEES
BASED ON A FLAWED LEGAL CONCLUSION AND WITHOUT
MAKING SUFFICIENT FINDINGS OF FACT.

Although courts have discretion to award attorney's fees in divorce cases, Bolliger
v. Bolliger, 2000 UT App 47, U 26, 997 P.3d 903, that discretion is not unlimited. See
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, If 9, 11 P.3d 277. For instance, a decision premised on
flawed legal conclusions constitutes a per se abuse of discretion. Id. Courts have no
discretion to act contrary to Utah law, and this court is the arbiter of what Utah law is.
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The lower court's stated reason for ordering Husband to pay Wife's attorney's fees
and costs was that Wife prevailed on the issue of whether Utah should have declined
jurisdiction in the first place. R:387, Hrg. Transc. 10:6-11:22 (October 22, 2008,
Hearing). The court below did not offer any alternative rationale besides this faulty legal
conclusion to justify its decision to award fees and costs to Wife. Therefore, because the
decision to decline jurisdiction was premised on an erroneous interpretation of the
UIFSA, the court committed a per se abuse of discretion by forcing Husband to pay
Wife's costs and fees.
In addition, this court has held time and time again that courts cannot award
attorney's fees in divorce cases without making explicit findings of fact that (I) the
receiving spouse is in financial need of attorney ysfeesf (2) the obligor spouse has the
ability to pay, and (3) the fees and costs sought are reasonable. Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT
App 1,118, 203 P.3d 1020 (emphasis added). Failure to explicitly make all these
requisite findings likewise constitutes an abuse of discretion because omitting a requisite
finding precludes effective appellate review. Id; Bakanowski v. Bakanowski, 2003 UT
App 357,1| 10, 80 P.3d 153.
Although the court below was mindful of this well-kno>vn test and made findings
as to reasonableness and Husband's ability to pay, Wife did not present any evidence by
way of affidavit, exhibit, or proffer that she needed help paying her own legal expenses.
Accordingly, the court made no finding that she needed help paying her legal expenses
(especially given the fact she is enjoying a Utah cost-of-living while receiving extra child
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support payments based on a higher California cost-of-living). By failing to present any
evidence of this essential element of her demand for attorney's fees coupled with the
court's failure to make any finding she needed help, there was no legal basis to award
attorney's fees to Wife. Accordingly, in addition to exceeding its discretion by awarding
attorney's fees premised on a flawed legal conclusion, the court below also exceeded its
discretion by awarding attorney's fees to Wife without finding she was in need of help
paying her legal fees.
For both these reasons, the lower court's decision to award Wife attorney's fees
and costs must be vacated in its entirety.
V.

CLAIM PRECLUSION DOES NOT APPLY BECAUSE
CALIFORNIA DELEGATED THE QUESTION OF JURISDICTION
TO UTAH.
California's subsequent September 30, 2008 ruling has no preclusive effect on this

court's authority to correct the Utah District Court's erroneous decision declining
jurisdiction in the first place because California's December 3, 2007 ruling delegated the
authority to decide which state should exercise jurisdiction to Utah. California
conditioned its retention of jurisdiction on Utah declining to observe jurisdiction over this
case. Wife conceded this delegation before the court below and stated:
"The [California] Court declines to make orders on the issue of modification of
child support based on the knowledge there is a pending motion in Utah. If Utah
refuses to observe jurisdiction over the issue, either party may file their motion to
be heard before [the California] Court. So, the bottom line is basically the
Court in California was just deferring to our Court to determine whether we
were going to proceed, and then if this [Utah] Court did not proceed, find it
has jurisdiction, then either party could proceed in California..."
R: 388, Hrg. Transcr. 9:8-18 (March 10, 2008) (emphasis added).
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It was not until after the Utah trial court erroneously declined jurisdiction over this
matter that California modified its order. So, the question arisps whether a California trial
court has the power to bar this court from ever judicially reviewing an inferior Utah
court's judgment just by issuing a subsequent order premised on the erroneous Utah
judgment in controversy? The answer is that a California trial court cannot substantially
infringe on this court's appellate authority in such a manner, 4nd this court may refuse to
grant preclusive effect to California's modification order consistent with the full faith and
credit clause and California law.
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly endorsed the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments as authority on under what circumstances a court niiay deny preclusive effect to
a judgment issued by another court. See Salt Lake City v. Silver Fork Pipline Co., 913
P.2d 731, 733(Utah 1996); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 8|7 P.2d 227, 230-31 (Utah
1992).
Section 28 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments allows re-litigation of an
issue in circumstances such as this where a party could not, as| a matter of law, have
obtained judicial review of the judgment in the initial action, because California issued
an order modifying support after the Utah trial court erroneously declined jurisdiction,
there was nothing a California appellate court could do to rempdy this problem and force
Utah to accept jurisdiction. Only a Utah appellate court had th£ power to correct a Utah
court's erroneous decision declining jurisdiction. Thus, any appeal taken from the
California trial court's decision would have been an exercise iji futility and barred by law
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because California had no choice but to offer Wife a proverbial "port in a storm" until
Utah's judgment declining jurisdiction was reversed. Under these special and unique
circumstances, Section 28 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments justifies denying
any preclusive effect to California's modification order because to hold otherwise would
place Husband in an impossible catch-22 where neither California nor Utah's appellate
courts could judicially review this matter. This case simply does not present the kind of
circumstances that the policies underlying preclusion were designed to guard against.
For similar reasons, Section 12 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments also
supports denying preclusive effect to California's modification order. This section states:
"[w]hen a court has rendered a judgment in a contested action, the judgment
precludes the parties from litigating the question of the court's subject matter
jurisdiction in subsequent litigation except if:
(1) The subject matter of the action was so plainly beyond the court's jurisdiction
that its entertaining the action was a manifest abuse of authority; or
(2) Allowing the judgment to stand would substantially infringe on the
authority of another tribunal or agency of government."
Id. (emphasis added).
Here, allowing California's reliance on the erroneous judgment of the court below
to infringe on this tribunal's power to judicially review and correct the ruling of an
inferior Utah court would substantially infringe on this court's authority and duty to
ensure Utah courts are correctly following Utah law. Granting preclusion in cases like this
would render the decisions of District Court Judges and even Commissioners immune
from judicial review so long as the prevailing party was able to persuade a sister-state's
court to rely on that judgment before the non-prevailing party could obtain judicial review
before this court. This would prevent this court from ensuring Utah's interstate support
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modification laws are in harmony with its sister-states until it was too late. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78B-14-901. Such a holding is untenable and would p^ace Husband in an
impossible catch-22. For these reasons, pursuant to Section l£ of the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, this court must not grant California's reliance on the erroneous
decision of the court below any preclusive effect.
Fortunately, judicial review and reversal of the Utah court's judgment will not
present any full faith and credit issues because a judgment issued by a sister-state is
entitled to no more preclusive effect than it would possess under the laws of the State in
which the judgment was rendered. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738. Under California law, an order
giving effect to a void judgment is void itself. Residents for Adequate Water v. Redwood
Valley County Water Dist., 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 123, 125 (CaLApiU Dist 1995)(citing Ventura
County v. Tillett 183 Cal.Rptr. 741 (Cal.App.2 Dist 1982)). Void judgments remain open
to both direct and collateral attack even if the underlying judgment itself was not
appealed. Id. It is well-settled law that void judgments have nb preclusive effect. Roy
Shepherd Ins. v.Mayer, 883 P.2d 1358 (Utah 1994).
Because California conditioned its retention of jurisdiction based on how Utah
ruled, the validity of the California court's subsequent order i$ conditioned on the validity
of the Utah court's judgment declining jurisdiction in the first place. As a general rule, the
ruling of an appellate court is deemed to state the true nature Of the law retrospectively.
Malan v.Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 676 (Utah 1984). Therefore, by holding that the court
below misconstrued the UIFSA and erroneously declined jurisdiction in the first place,
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this court will be retroactively vacating the very order California's assumption of
jurisdiction is conditioned upon. 4 Under California law, this will automatically render
California's September 30, 2008, judgment void on its face because "an order giving
effect to a void judgment is also void." In re Marriage of Brockman, 240 Cal.Rptr. 96, 97
(Cal.App.2d Dist 1987). Inasmuch as void judgments carry no preclusive effect, Wife's
claim preclusion and full faith and credit defenses become moot. Roy Shepherd, 883 P.3d
at 1358 (Once an appellate court eliminates the basis for res judicata, the judgment
appealed may be reversed).
Reversing the judgment of the court below and thereby invalidating California's
order made in reliance on that judgment will not infringe on California's authority nor
deny its judgments full-faith and credit. Rather, this court will be giving full faith to
California's December 3, 2007, decision conditioning its retention of jurisdiction based
on how Utah ruled. If Utah asserted jurisdiction - California would not. Therefore, there
is no full faith and credit issue by holding that Utah should have accepted subject-matter
jurisdiction to begin with.
A. ALTERNATIVELY, CALIFORNIA IS OBLIGED TO VACATE ITS
ORDER ONCE THIS COURT REVERSES THE JUDGMENT OF THE
COURT BELOW.
Alternatively, if this court believes reversing the Utah court's decision declining

4
This solution is distinguishable and does not conflict with this court's recent
decision in Maero v. Topaz, 2009 UT App 300, 221 P.3d 860, because the bankruptcy
court in Maero never conditioned its ruling on how the Utah court ruled. Conversely, here
California delegated the authority to decide which court should exercise jurisdiction to
this court and conditioned its exercise of jurisdiction upon this court's ruling.
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jurisdiction would only render California's judgment voidable - as opposed to void- then
comment c of Section 16 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments provides a solution to
reconcile these otherwise inconsistent judgments:
"If, when the earlier judgment is set aside or reversed, the later judgment is still
subject to a post-judgment motion for a new trial or the like ... a party may inform
the trial or appellate court of the nullification of the earlier judgment and the
consequent eliminating of the basis for the later judgment. The court should then
normally set aside the later judgment." Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d
227, 230-31 (Utah I992)(citing Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 16, com. c).
Under California law, a party may file a post-judgment motion to vacate a
judgment giving effect to a void judgment at any time. California Code Civ. P. § 473(d);
Cf. Utah R. of Civ. P. § 60(b)(5) (Courts may set aside a final order when the judgment it
is based upon is later reversed or vacated). Upon being informed of this court's
nullification of the Utah court's decision declining jurisdiction which formed the basis for
its retention of jurisdiction, California would be obliged to s^t aside its judgment thereby
eliminating any preclusive effect its decision might otherwise carry. Accordingly, after
reversing the Utah court's erroneous judgment declining jurisdiction in the first place, this
court may reverse and remand this case back to the trial court with instructions to grant
Husband sixty (60) days to petition California to vacate its September 30, 2008, judgment
in light of this reversal. Assuming California complies with its own precedents and
vacates its order giving effect to a voided judgment, Wife's [preclusion argument would
still be rendered moot.
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B. CALIFORNIA'S ORDER IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT FOR CHILD SUPPORT ORDERS ACT AND
THEREFORE NOT ENTITLED TO PRECLUSIVE EFFECT.
Even assuming, arguendo, this court disagreed and felt reversing the Utah court's
order declining jurisdiction would not render California's judgment void or voidable,
California's judgment is still not entitled to preclusive effect under the Federal Full Faith
and Credit for Child Support Orders Act. The FFCC SOA governs which child support
orders are entitled to full faith and credit, and which ones are open to collateral attack. 28
U.S.C. § 1738B.
Being an act of Congress, the FFCCSOA has conflict preemption over state law.
The FFCCSOA states each state must enforce child support orders "made consistently
with this section" by a court of another state. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(a). Given the
presumption Congress inserted the caveat "made consistently with this section" advisedly,
See Verslus v. Guaranty Nat. Companies, 842 P.2d 865, 867 (Utah 1992), by negative
implication a child support order made inconsistently with the FFCCSOA is not entitled
to full faith and credit and is open to collateral attack. Cf. Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717,
722 (Utah App. 1990)(Context of PKPA).
The FFCCSOA states a child support is made "consistently with this section" if (1)
the court that makes the order, pursuant to the laws of the state in which the court is
located and subsections (e), (f), and (g), ~ (A) has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the
matter and enter such an order ..." 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(c). A court of a State that has
previously issued a support order has jurisdiction to modify its support order if that State
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is still "the child's State or the residence of any individual contestant..." 28 U.S.C. §
1738B(d). Although the FFCCSOA does not define "residence/' California has construed
this exact same language in the UIFSA as synonymous with "domicile," and has held that
military service-members stationed in California are not domiciled in California.
Amezquita, 124 CaLRptr.2d 887; accord Basileh, 890 N.E.2d at 784-88 ("Residence" in
FFCCSOA means domicile) affd in part and vacated in part on other grounds 912
N.E.2d 814 fn 1 (Ind. 2009); See also Tucker, 277 Cal.Rptr. 403 (Fact soldier is deployed
to California; sued for divorce by wife in California; and consents to California divorce
does not give the soldier a California domicile).
Consequently, the only way for California to assert jurisdiction to modify child
support is to make a specific finding that Husband had a California domicile. However,
the judgment and transcript of the California court's September 30, 2008, proceeding are
devoid of this requisite factual finding. The California court piade no inquiry into where
Husband was domiciled - it simply based its decision on the irrelevant fact Husband
made a "general appearance" in California and did not oppose Wife registering the Utah
support order in California. However, neither of these findii^gs provide a basis for
asserting jurisdiction under the FFCCSOA.
This court confronted a similar situation when a Mississippi court issued a final
custody order based on the erroneous belief it had subject-matter jurisdiction because the
appellant made a "general appearance" in Mississippi. Curtis v. Curtis, 789 P.2d 717,
718-20 (Utah App. 1990). Applying the FFCCSOA's custody counterpart, the PKPA, 28
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U.S.C. § 1738A, this court held, as a matter of federal law, Mississippi's order was void
because federal law did not permit it to assert subject-matter jurisdiction using the
personal jurisdiction doctrine of "general appearance." Id. at 720-726. This court
correctly noted that while a "general appearance" in a foreign court waives any objection
to personal jurisdiction, it does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction on that court. Id. at
725-26. Consequently, Mississippi's final custody order was invalid as a matter of federal
law under the PKPA. Id.
Like the PKPA applied in Curtis, nothing in the plain language of the FFCCSOA
allows California, as a matter of federal law, to assert subject-matter jurisdiction simply
because Husband made a general appearance in California and did not oppose Wife
registering the Utah child support order in California. In the absence of a specific finding
that Husband was a California domiciliary, there was no statutory basis for California to
assert subject-matter jurisdiction consistent with the FFCCSOA. Consequently,
California's September 30, 2008, judgment is void for want of jurisdiction as a matter of
federal law and not entitled to any preclusive effect.
C. PRECLUSION DOES NOT BAR THIS COURT FROM CONSIDERING
WHETHER IT WAS ERROR TO AWARD ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Finally, even assuming, arguendo, this court held California's subsequent
judgment made in reliance on the erroneous decision of the court below was entitled to
preclusion regardless of how erroneous the predicate decision was, this does not impede
this court from reviewing whether the court below exceeded its discretion by awarding
attorney's fees based on a flawed interpretation of Utah law before California issued its
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subsequent ruling. Cf. Searle v. Searle, 2001 UT App 367? f 13, 38 P.3d 307 {citing Lund,
2000 UT 75 at Tf 9). If the court below awarded attorneys fees because it misconstrued
Utah law then its decision was still a per se abuse of discretion because a California trial
court does not have the power to bind how this court interprets Utah law.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF REQUESTED
For the foregoing reasons, Husband asks this court for the following precise relief:
(1) To hold that the term "residence" refers to legal residence in the context of the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA);
(2) To hold that Utah military service-members, like Husband, who are physically
absent from Utah because of military service presumptively retain their legal
residence in Utah absent clear and convincing proof that they have established a
legal residence elsewhere during the course of their deployment;
(3) To hold that Utah acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over this matter under Utah
Code Ann. §§ 78B-14-205 and 78B-14-613 once Wife left California because now
both parents and their child legally reside in Utah;
(4) To reverse the lower court's judgment dismissing Husband's Amended Petition to
modify child support and remanding this case back to the trial court for further
proceedings;
(5) To hold that California's September 30, 2008, order is void on its face and not
entitled to preclusive effect because it is premised on a now vacated Utah
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judgment, inconsistent with the FFCCSSOA, and California delegated the
authority to decide which state should exercise jurisdiction to Utah. In the
alternative, to grant Husband sixty (60) days to petition the California court to
vacate or stay its September 30, 2008, order based on this court's reversal of the
Utah court's decision declining jurisdiction in the first place; and
(6) To reverse the Utah District Court's judgments awarding attorney's fees and costs
to Wife in their entirety.

Respectfully submitted this [£_ day of February, 2010.

Mark Wiser, Esq.
Counsel for Appellant Aaron Lilly
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that on this }*> day of February, 2010,1 caused two (2) copies of
Appellant's Brief and Appendix to be sent to the following parties via first-class
United States Mail, postage prepaid:

David R. Blaisdell, Esq.
Counsel for Appellee Korilee Lilly
5995 So. Redwood Rd.
Salt Lake City, UT 84123

y

Mark Wiser, Counsel for Appellant
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APPENDIX
1. Order Dismissing Amended Petition to Modify, dated October 20, 2009.
2. Minute Entry denying Appellant's objections to the Domestic Relations
Commissioner's recommendation awarding attorney's fees and costs to Petitioner,
dated December 9, 2008.
3. Order Awarding Attorneys Fees to Petitioner dated November 3, 2008.
4. Minute Entry denying Appellant's objections to the Domestic Relations
Commissioner's recommendation on the question of whether the UIFSA looks to
legal or physical residence, dated October 28, 2008.
5. Order from September 17, 2008, hearing before the Domestic Relations
Commissioner, dated October 1, 2008.
6. Unpublished decision ofBlock v. Block, 2005 WL 89472, 2005 Minn.App. LEXIS
26 (Minn.App. Jan 18, 2005).
7. Unpublished decision of Grimes v. McFarland, 2003 WL 21787030 (Tex.AppHous. 14th Dist).
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL. DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH
KOR1LEE LILLY
Petitioner,
v.

ORDER DISMISSING AMENDED
PETITION TO MODIFY
Case No.: 074904948

AARON M. LILLY,
Respondent.

Judge: Glenn K. Iwasaki
Commissioner: T. Patrick Casey

Petitioner Korilee Lilly's Motions for summary judgment jand additional attorney's fees,
along with Respondent Aaron Lilly's opposition thereto, came before this Court for a hearing on
August 26,2009, the Honorable Commissioner T. Patrick Casey presiding.
Petitioner was represented by counsel, David Blaisdell. Respondent was represented by
counsel, Mark Wiser.
After reviewing the briefs and exhibits submitted by the parties, hearing oral argument,
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Commissibncr made various
recommendations concerning matters in dispute.
Wherefore, it is hereby the order of this Court as follows:
I. Respondent's Amended Petition to Modify Child Support is hereby dismissed without
prejudice pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1) of the Rules of Civp Procedure.
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2. This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Respondent's request to modify
child support under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (Utah Code Ann. § 78B14 et seq ) because the parties' original child support order was issued in California and
Respondent Aaron Lilly still physically lives in California. Petitioner has also not filed a
writing consenting to this Court assuming jurisdiction over this matter,
3. This Court interprets the UIFSA's use of the terms ^residence" and "resides" to mean
which state a parent physically lives in a&-eppo$edHe-wtoeh-sto^

ryf

j£skte£fow4ias^^
4. This Court has not made any findings of fact on the question of whether Respondent
remains domiciled in Utah or whether he acquired a California domicile during the course
of his military deployment there. Consequently, if the appellate court reverses this Court's
judgment and holds that the UIFSA looks to legal residence as opposed to physical
residence, an evidentiary hearing will probably be necessary on remand to determine
which state Respondent legally resides in.
5. Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED because it became moot after the
ruling on the Motion for Clarification. Nevertheless, if this Court's judgment is reversed
on appeal then Petitioner may renew her motion on remand.
6. Petitioner's Motion for attorney's fees is DENIED on the basis this Court's grant of
Respondent's Motion for clarification made Petitioner's opposition thereto and subsequent
motion for summary judgment unnecessary. Nevertheless, the issue of attorney fees is reserved if
the appellate court remands this matter.
7. This is the final order and judgment of this Court disposing of this matter as to all claims,
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all parties, and the issue of attorney's fees and costs.

BY THE COURT
DATED t h iss * ? day of

2009.

The Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
RECOMMENDEp&Y: ^
DATED this / £ day of • j 0-'i:k^

•J

.., 2009.

M

i

!

'<

-+-

The Honorable T. Patrick Casey
DISTRICT CJOURT COMMISSIONER
Approved aslto form:
DATED this __ day of m

- /

j 2009.

David R. Blaisdell, Esq.
Counsel for the Petitioner

NOT ICE TO ALL PARTIES

Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2), this proposed Order will be filed with the Court five
days after service upon you. Your objections, if any, must be filed with the Court within five
davs after service.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KORILEE LILLY
Plaintiff
-vsAARON M. LI-JLY
Defendant

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 074904948
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI
Date: DECEMBER 9, 2008

The Court has reviewed the requests for decisions submitted
by the part'es, Commissioner Casey's Minutes of September 17,
2008 and October 22, 2008, this Court's Minute Entry of October
28, 2008, Respondent's Partial Objection to Commissioner Casey's
Recommendat .on of October 22, 2008 re: fees; Respondent's Motion
to Alter or Amend this Court's Minute Entry of October 28, 2C08,
all supporting and opposition memos and rules as follows:
As to the Motion to Alter or Amend, the Court denies the
Motion to Alter or Amend It's Minute Entry of October 28, 2008
which denied the objection to Commissioner Casey's
Recommendation contained in the Minutes and subsequent order to
the September 17, 2008 hearing.

Also, the Court denies the

Request for a "New Trial" or Oral Argument or Request to: a
De Novo Hea -:i rig .

MINUTE ENTRV

PA GE

2

07490^948

Reqard^ng the Respondent's Partial Objection to
Commissioner Casey's Recommendation re: tees, the Cour^ finds
that Commissioner Casey coriectly exeicsed his discrericn and
did not commit error, as aLleged by respondent, m

his

recommendat' or:.
This s gned Minute Entry will be th^ Order of the Ccurt on
these issues.

GKI/jmb
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DAVID R. BLA1SDELL ^ 6 0
BLAISDELL & CHURCH. P.C.
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Attorneys lor Petitioner
5995 South Redwood Road
Salt Lake City. Utah 84123
'lelephonc: (801) 261-3407
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IN I HE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRiC I COURT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAII

KOR1LEE LILLY.
Petitioner.

:

ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEYS
FEES TO PETITIONER

vs.
Civil No. 074904948
AARON MATTHEW LILLY,
:
Respondent.

Judge lwasaki
Commissioner ('asey

Petitioner's Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees dated September 26lh, 2008 duly came for
hearing before the above-entitled Court on October 22, 2008, at 9:00 a.m., the Honorable
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey presiding. Petitioner appeared in person and through her counsel
of record, David R. Blaisdcll and Respondent appeared through his counsel of record, Mark Wiser,
but did not appear in person. The Motion was argued, submitted for ruling and the Court found that:
1. There has been no bad faith and a good faith dispute exists between the parties.
2. Both the provisions of the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act and 30-1-3, Utah Code
Annotated are a predicate for the award of attorneys fees.

JD27354059

074904948 LILLY,AARON
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3. It is not appropriate to defer the award of attorneys lees pending appeal.
4. It is not appropriate for Petitioner to attempt to enforqe the award of attorneys fees
pending the ruling of Judge Iwasaki on Respondent's Objection to Commissioner's
Recommendation.
5. Petitioner is the prevailing party.
6. The attorneys fees requested arc reasonable in amount and relevant to the issues herein.
7. There is no evidence that Respondent is impecunious.
8. There are no facts that indicate that the requested attorneys fees should not be awarded.
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. Petitioner's Motion for Award of Attorneys Fees is grantjed,
2. Petitioner is awarded Judgment against Respondent in |the sum of $3,325.00 for her
attorneys fees.
3.

The issue of Petitioner's attorneys fees arising in conjunction with Respondent's

Objection to Commissioner's Recommendalion is reserved, to be determined by the Honorable
Glenn K. Iwasaki in conjunction with such Objection.
4. Pending the determination of the Objection to Commissioner's Recommendation,
Petitioner shall take no steps to enforce this Order.

DATED this 2 day of jO^U:_

, 2008.
BY THE COURT:

i

JUDGE GLENN K. WAS

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KORILEE LILLY
Petitioner
-vs-

:
:
:
:

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 074904948
JUDGE GLENN K. IWASAKI

AARON M. LILLY
Respondent

;
:
:

Date: OCTOBER 28, 2008

The Court has reviewed Commissioner Casey's Minutes of
September l'?, 2008, Respondent's objections, Petitioner's
response, Respondent's Motion to Strike, Petitioner's response,
other relevant pleadings and denies the motion.
As an initial matter, the Court denies the Motion to Strike
and has considered Petitioner's objections.

With that said, the

Court does not find any abuse of discretion nor error in law as
to Commissioner Casey's recommendations.
The Court signed the submitted Recommendations and Order on
October 1, 2008 and that will remain the order of the Court on
these issuers.

MINUTE ENTRY
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Dated t h i s

2 8 t h d a y of O c t o b e r ,

C74904948

2008,
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M I D DISTRICT COURT
DAVID R. BLAISDELL #360
BLAISDLLL & CHURCH. P.O.
Attorneys for Petitioner
5(W5 South Redwood Road
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123
Telephone: (801) 261-3407

Third Judicial District

OCT - 1 2008
SALT LAKE GOuuTV
B y

—

"f^puty Clerk"

IN THL THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT. IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY. UTAH

KORILEH LILLY.

ORDER

Petitioner,
vs.
Civil No. 074904948
AARON MATTHEW LILLY,
Judge lwasaki
Commissioner Casey

Respondent.

Respondent's Motion to Determine Residency and Choice of Law duly came for hearing
before the above-entitled Court on September 17.2008. at 9:00 a.m.. the Honorable T. Patrick Casey
presiding. Petitioner appeared in person and through her counsel of record, David R. Blaisdell and
Respondent appeared in person and through his counsel of record, Mark Wiser The Motion was
argued, and the Court found that:
1. Respondent dwells, maintains an abode, has a bodily presence and lives in the physical
sense in the State of California;
2. The parties maintained their marital residence in the State of California;

1

3. Both parties were residents of the State of California tor the purpose of invoking
jurisdiction for their divorce;
4. Respondent did not object to the exercise of jurisdiction of the parties' divorce hv the
State of California,
5. It is a fiction that Respondent lives in the State of Utah, and
6. No additional evidence was presented that was not presented at the hearing on March 10.
2008. at which time the Court ruled that this Coun docs not have jurisdiction to modify the
California Judgment, without the written consent of each party;
Based upon the foregoing, and good cause appearing.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows:
1. Respondent's Motion To Determine Residency and Choice of Law is denied.
2. The State of Utah has no jurisdiction to modify the existing child support order contained
in the Judgment of Dissolution entered in the State of California.
3. The State of California retains exclusive jurisdiction to modify the existing child support
order contained in the Judgment of Dissolution.
4. The Court's prior Order dated March 26, 2008 remains in full force and effect.
DATED this l_ day of JjC^

, 2008.
BY THE COURT:
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OPINION

HUDSON, Judge
Respondent registered a Texas child-support decree in Minnesota, and the district court
modified appellant's child-support obligation. Appellant argues on appeal that the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Texas decree under the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act. Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to modify the Texas
decree, we reverse.
FACTS
The parties married in Minnesota. Both parties were domiciled in Minnesota at the
time of their marriage. Appellant entered the United States armed forces shortly thereafter and
was transferred to a military base in Texas. The parties' marriage was dissolved by final decree
on April 17, 2000, in Coryell County, Texas. The Texas court found that it had jurisdiction
over the dissolution because appellant was domiciled in Texas at the time of filing. Pursuant to
the dissolution, the Texas court ordered appellant to pay regular monthly child support. The
decree further authorized respondent to leave the jurisdiction and establish a primary residence
for the parties' children. Respondent returned to Minnesota with the parties' children and
established their domicile in Dodge County. The Army stationed appellant in South Korea, but
appellant maintained a home in Texas.
In April 2003, respondent registered the Texas decree in Dodge County, Minnesota.
Respondent moved to modify appellant's child-support obligation in Dodge County in June 2003,
requesting that the district court assume subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant remained stationed
in South Korea at the time of respondent's motion. The district court held a hearing on August
19, 2003. Appellant challenged the district court's subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA), Minn. Stat. ch. 518C (2002). The district court agreed to
assume jurisdiction and granted respondent's motion to modify the Texas child-support order on
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December 16, 2003. Appellant moved for a new trial or amended findings. The district court
upheld its December 16, 2003 order modifying appellant's child-support obligation on April 29,
2004. This appeal follows.
DECISION
Questions of subject matter jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. Johnson v. Murray, 648
N.W.2d 664, 670 (Minn. 2002). Because subject matter jurisdiction goes to a court's authority
to preside over a matter, an appellant may raise the lack of subject matter jurisdiction for the
first time on appeal. Cochrane v. Tudor Oaks Condo. Project, 529 N.W.2d 429, 432 (Minn.
App. 1995) (citing Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.08(c)), review denied (Minn. May 31, 1995). "An
appellate court will determine jurisdictional facts on its own motion even though neither party
has raised the issue." Carlson v. Cherrnak, 639 N.W.2d 886, 889 (Minn. App. 2002). If this
court determines that a district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over a matter on appeal,
it must dismiss the action. Minn. R. Civ. P. 12.08(c).
Appellant argues that the district court improperly assumed subject matter jurisdiction
over the Texas child-support order under the UIFSA. Minnesota and Texas have both adopted
the UIFSA. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518C.101~518C.902 (2002); Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§
159.001-159.902 (2002). When applying and construing a state's codification of the UIFSA,
courts must give consideration to the need to promote uniformity in the law with respect to
other states adopting similar provisions. See Minn. Stat. §§ 518C.901, 645.22 (2002); Tex.
Fam. Code Ann. § 159.901 (2002). Under section 205 of the UIFSA, as codified in Texas,
Texas courts retain continuing, exclusive jurisdiction to modify a child-support order issued in
Texas
(1) as long as this state remains the residence of the obligor, the
individual obligee, or the child for whose benefit the support order
is issued; or
(2) until all of the parties who are individuals have filed written
consents with the tribunal of this state for a tribunal of another state
to modify the order and assume continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
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Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 159.205(a) (2002); see also Minn. Stat. § 518C.205(a) (2002)
(providing a similar statement of law applicable to child-support orders issued by Minnesota
courts).
A Minnesota court may modify a foreign child-support order if the order has been
registered in Minnesota and, after notice and a hearing, the registering court finds that:
(i) the child, the individual obligee, and the obligor do not reside in
the issuing state;
(ii) a petitioner who is a nonresident of this state sefeks modification;
and
(iii) the respondent is subject to the personal jurisdiction of the
tribunal of this state.
Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(a)(1) (2002). Additionally, a Minnesota court can assume jurisdiction to
modify the Texas order if both parents are residents of Minnesota and the child no longer lives in
Texas. See Minn. Stat. § 518C.613(a) (2002). And finally, a Minnesota court may modify a
foreign child-support order if
the child, or a party who is an individual, is subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the tribunal of this state and all of the parties who are
individuals have filed written consents in the issuing tribunal for a
tribunal of this state to modify the support order and assume
continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the order. However, if the
issuing state is a foreign jurisdiction that has not enacted a law or
established procedures substantially similar to the procedures in this
chapter, the consent otherwise required of an individual residing in
this state is not required for the tribunal to assume jurisdiction to
modify the child support order.
Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(a)(2) (2002).
Accordingly, unless the circumstances at hand satisfy one of the above three criteria,
Texas retains exclusive jurisdiction over the Texas child-support order, and we must vacate the
district court's orders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The district court does not have jurisdiction to modify the Texas child-support order
under either Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(a)(1) or Minn. Stat. § 518C.613(a) because the parties do
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not satisfy the residency requirements. Respondent, a Minnesota resident, is the petitioner
seeking modification in Minnesota. Under section 518C.611(a)(1), the district court lacks
jurisdiction if the petitioner resides in Minnesota. See Porro v. Porro, 675 N.W.2d 82, 87
(Minn. App. 2004) (holding that the requirements for jurisdiction under section 518C.611(a)
(l)(ii) were not met where the mother was a Minnesota resident). Further, because appellant
is not a Minnesota resident, the district court cannot exercise jurisdiction under section
518C.613(a).^
Respondent argues that Minnesota courts have subject matter jurisdiction over the
Texas child-support order under Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(a)(2) because appellant did not
present evidence at the district court level of Texas's conformity with the UIFSA. Under
section 518C.611(a)(2), if Texas has not codified the UIFSA, or some other similar provision,
Minnesota courts may assume jurisdiction over the Texas order without obtaining appellant's
consent. Respondent's argument fails because it misconstrues this court's scope of review over
the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. Subject matter jurisdiction is an issue that can be
raised for the first time on appeal. Cochrane, 529 N.W.2d at 432 (citing Minn. R. Civ. P.
12.08(c)). And this court may take judicial notice of Texas's status as a signatory. See Minn.
R. Evid. 201(b). Accordingly, because Texas is a signatory to the UIFSA, Minnesota courts do
not have jurisdiction to modify the Texas child-support order under Minn. Stat. §
518C.611(a)(2) without the consent of the parties. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§
159.001-159.902.
Respondent next argues that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction under
Minn. Stat. § 518C.611(a)(2) because this provision is unique to Minnesota. Texas's
codification of the UIFSA does not contain a similar jurisdiction-granting provision and,
therefore, respondent contends that Texas's codification is not "substantially similar" to the
Minnesota statutes. We disagree. Respondent's argument isolates one subpart of a section in
the Minnesota codification of the UIFSA and ignores the similarity between the rest of Minn.
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Stat. §§ 518C.101-518C.902 and Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 159.001-159.902. The Texas
UIFSA is substantially similar to the Minnesota codification. Consequently, the district court
does not have subject matter jurisdiction under section 518.611(a)(2) unless appellant files a
written consent.
Finally, respondent argues that the Minnesota court had ancillary subject matter
jurisdiction to modify the Texas child-support order under the UIFSA because the Minnesota
court had subject matter jurisdiction for purposes of custody modification under Minnesota's
codification of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). See
Minn. Stat. §§ 518D.101-518D.317 (2002). Assuming that Minnesota had and exercised
subject matter jurisdiction over the custody provisions of the Texas order under the UCCJEA,
respondent's argument is without merit. Any application of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine to
the UIFSA would defeat its explicit requirement of one state with exclusive jurisdiction, and its
purpose of imposing uniformity.

See Minn. Stat. § 645.22; National Conference of

Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, UIFSA (2001) Prefatory Note II.B.3 (noting that the
UIFSA was meant to ensure that "only one valid support order may be effective at any one
time/' even though the parties and their children may leave the issuing state). Moreover, the
two Minnesota cases addressing jurisdiction under the UIFSA and UCCJEA analyze the
jurisdictional requirements separately without invoking ancillary jurisdiction. See Schroeder v.
Schroeder, 658 N.W.2d 909, 912-13 (Minn. App. 2003); Stone v. Stone, 636 N.W.2d 594,
596-97 (Minn. App. 2001). Accordingly, the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to
modify the Texas child-support order under the UIFSA.
Reversed.

m Although respondent's status as a Minnesota resident disposes of the jurisdictional issue
under section 518C.611(a)(1), the parties devoted considerable argument to defining
"residence" under the UIFSA. The terms "residence" and "domicile" are frequently used
interchangeably by our legislature, particularly in the area of family law. See Minn. Stat. §
518.003, subd. 2 (2002) (defining "residence" to mean "the place where a party has
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established a permanent home from which the party has no present intention of moving"). The
UIFSA gives one state continuing exclusive jurisdiction over child-support matters. An
individual therefore cannot have more than one residence. Thus, "residence" for purposes of
the UIFSA means domicile.
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MEMORANDUM

OPINION

Appellant, Wilbur Grimes, appeals the dismissal of his motion to modify child support
and the special appearance granted to appellee, Lois McFarland. In a single issue, appellant
contends the trial court erred in dismissing his motion to modify child support for lack of
jurisdiction. We affirm.
FACTS
McFarland and Grimes divorced after Grimes was indicted for sexually assaulting their
minor, female child. On May 5, 2001, they signed an Agreed Final Decree of Divorce. On the
same day, McFarland and the child moved to Kansas. The trial court then signed and entered
the divorce decree on June 18, 2001. McFarland traveled from Kansas to appear for the
uncontested June divorce hearing. Grimes traveled to Tennessee, although there were several
outstanding warrants for his arrest in Texas. While in Tennessee, on November 26, 2001,
Grimes filed a Motion to Modify the Parent-Child Relationship in Harris County, contesting child

Texas Judiciary Online - HTML Opinion

http://www.14thcoa.courts.state.tx.us/opinions/htmIopinion.asp70pini.

support and custody. He never served McFarland with a copy of his motion. Thereafter, while
confined within a Texas jail, Grimes amended his motion and served McFarland in Kansas on
January 28, 2002.
On February 26, 2002, McFarland filed a special appearance and her answer, alleging
that she lived in Kansas, had no contact with Texas, and Grimes was now a resident of
Tennessee. An evidentiary hearing before an associate judge was held on April 5, 2002. At the
hearing, McFarland agreed to abate Grimes's obligation to pay child support during the pendency
of the criminal case. The judge sustained her special appearance as to child support only.
However, Grimes appealed the associate judge's ruling and requested a hearing de novo on all
special appearance issues. On May 2, 2002, following a hearing before the presiding judge of
the 311th District Court, McFarland's special appearance was sustained. The court, inter alia,
rendered the following Finding of Fact: "neither the child (CKG) nor either of (her) parents
presently reside in the State of Texas or have a significant connection with the State of Texas."
The court also rendered the following Conclusion of Law: "this court has no personal or subject
matter jurisdiction." The court issued an order ruling that it did not have jurisdiction or, in the
alternative, declining to exercise jurisdiction under section 152.28 of the Family Code.
In four sub-issues appellant argues that (1) appellee waived her special appearance; (2)
under the Family Code, Texas retained exclusive jurisdiction; (3) he was a resident and
domiciliary of Texas; and (4) appellee was barred from "going behind" the divorce decree.

WAIVER
During the April 5, 2002 special appearance hearing before an associate judge,
McFarland asked the court to enter temporary orders abating Grimes's child support obligations.
In one of his sub-issues, Grimes contends that McFarland waived her special appearance when
she agreed that he was not obligated to pay child support during the pendency of his aggravated
sexual assault case. Generally, a party waives a special appearance if it seeks affirmative relief
or invokes the trial court's jurisdiction on any question other than the court's jurisdiction before
the trial court rules on the special appearance. Dawson-Austin v. Austin, 968 S.W.2d 319, 322
(Tex. 1998). In this case, however, the court had already ruled on the special appearance. The
associate judge ruled that Kansas had jurisdiction over the custody issue and that Texas would
retain jurisdiction over all support issues. Based on the court's ruling, and still subject to her
special appearance, McFarland then asked to abate Grimes's child support obligations pending
final disposition of his criminal case. Because the court ruled on the special appearance before
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McFarland offered or agreed to abate child support payments, we find she did not waive her
special appearance. Id.
SPECIAL APPEARANCE
In Grimes's remaining sub-issues, he challenges the trial court's decision to grant

m

McFarland's special appearance.
When the trial court enters findings of fact and conclusions
of law following the grant of a special appearance, we review findings of fact for sufficiency of
the evidence and conclusions of law de novo. See Linton v. Airbus Industrie, 934 S.W.2d '754,
757 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ denied). In conducting our review, we
consider all of the evidence that was before the trial court, including the pleadings, any
stipulations, affidavits and exhibits, the results of discovery, and any oral testimony. BHP de
Venezuela, CA. v. Casteig, 994 S.W.2d 321, 326 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1999, pet. denied)
(op. on reh'g).
A. Residency of McFarland and the Child
The Uniform Interstate Family Support Act O'UIFSA") addresses jurisdiction between
competing states involving matters of child support. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 152.001 159.902 (Vernon Supp. 2001). UIFSA provides:
(a) A tribunal of this state issuing a support order consistent with the
law of this state has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over a child
support order:
(1) as long as this state remains the residence of the
obligor, the individual obligee, or the child for whose
benefit the support order is issued
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 159.205(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2001).
Under UIFSA, the trial court retains jurisdiction if either the child, McFarland, or Grimes
remained a resident of Texas. During the special appearance hearing, McFarland testified she
and the child moved to Kansas in May 2001, after she signed the Agreed Divorce Decree. She
returned to Texas only once, in June 2001, to prove up the uncontested divorce. There was also
testimony that the child had firmly established relationships with physicians, counselors, and her
school. According to McFarland's testimony, she and the child did not have any contact with
Texas after June 2001. This evidence was undisputed, and Grimes has not challenged any of the
trial court's findings of fact regarding their residency.

121

Unchallenged findings of fact are

binding on the appellate court unless the contrary is established as a matter of law or there is no
evidence to support the trial court's findings. See London v. London, 94 S.W.3d 139, 149 (Tex.
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App — Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.). Because Grimes made no challenge to the trial
court's findings regarding McFarland's and the child's residency, we are bound by those
findings. Id. Therefore, we need only review the challenged findings as to Grimes's residency.
B. Residency of Grimes
Grimes is currently serving a twenty-two year prison sentence in Texas. He filed his
amended Motion to Modify while incarcerated in Harris County. Section 159 of the Family
Code does not define residency; however, residency has been defined in other family law
contexts. For example, a requirement to file for divorce under Chapter 6 of the Family Code, is
residency in the county in which suit is filed for the preceding 90-day period. TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. § 6.301 (Vernon Supp. 2003). In that context, residency has been defined as
physical presence in a county, accompanied by good faith intent to remain permanently and
definitely make that county one's home. Randle v. Randle, 178 S.W.2d 570, 572 (Tex. Civ.
App.—Galveston 1944, no writ); see also Vickery v. Comm'nfor Lawyer Discipline, 5 S.W.3d
241, 262 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. denied). Further, there is no reason an
inmate cannot file for divorce in the county where he is imprisoned; but he must intend to reside
in that county permanently after his release from prison. In re Marriage ofEarin, 519 S.W.2d
892, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist] 1975, no writ). By analogy, for Texas to be a
state of residence, a party should have actual, physical presence in the state coupled with a good
faith intent to make Texas home. For an inmate to establish residency in Texas, he or she must
intend in good faith to reside here permanently after release from prison.
In this case, the trial court entered findings of fact that Grimes was a resident of Texas
only while involuntarily incarcerated and that when he had the freedom to choose where to
reside, it was not Texas. The evidence shows that Grimes physically lived in Memphis,
Tennessee with his sister after leaving Texas in September 2001. He left Tennessee in December
2001 and turned himself in at the Harris County jail. Upon posting bond, he immediately
returned to Tennessee. Grimes filed his Motion to Modify from Tennessee. Finally, he advised
the Harris County Criminal Court that he no longer resided in Texas. We will reverse the trial
court's findings for factual insufficiency only where they are "so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence as to be manifestly erroneous or unjust." Cartlidge v.
Hernandez, 9 S.W.3d 341, 346 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.) (citing In re
King's Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951)). We have reviewed the record, and
we find there was sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Grimes was not a
resident of Texas.
CONCLUSION
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Because Grimes did not challenge the findings as to the residence of the child and
McFarland; and because there is sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Texas
was not Grimes's place of residence, we hold that the trial court did not err in granting the
special appearance. Accordingly, we overrule Grimes's single issue and affirm the trial court's
order.

/s/

Charles W. Seymore
Justice

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed August 5, 2003.
Panel consists of Justices Anderson, Seymore, and Guzman.

Grimes has limited his appeal to the special appearance granted on the child support issue.

[2]
Grimes contends McFarland is collaterally estopped from denying her Texas residency because of
averments in the divorce decree. To the extent such an argument is a challenge to the trial court's findings, it is
only a challenge up to the date of divorce. It does not cover findings of residency after the date of divorce.
Further, collateral estoppel is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded or it is waived. TEX. R. CIV. P. 94.
Because Grimes failed to plead collateral estoppel, he waived the issue on appeal.

